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Antologia: Miríade, Distopia, Utopia (2004-2024) -

     Antologia : Miríade, Distopia, Utopia  (2004-2024); @vanres1974; #antologia;  {11dez24 qua 20:40-20:50}      Anthology: Myriad, Dystopi...

Prof. Dr. Vander Resende, Doutorado em Lit Bras, pela UFMG; Mestre em Teorias Lit e Crít Cul, UFSJ

terça-feira, 2 de abril de 2024

216∆24 RUSSIAN VS NATO, IN UKRAINEdraft

Aug, 2024
Surrounded… Andrei Martyanov. On Toretsk and New York.
Back to the Bloodlands: Operation Krepost Big Serge. On the Kursk offensive. G

"the Russian security officials are expanding upon their claims that Ukraine financed and directed the terror attack on the Crocus City Hall concert venue. Sunday evening’s edition of News of the Week hosted by Dmitry Kiselyov pointed to crypto currency payments and other financial channels which were used by the Ukrainians, as the latest results of interrogations and further arrests have revealed. A substantial success reward is said to have awaited the assailants upon arrival in Kiev."

 https://gilbertdoctorow.com/#:~:text=the%20Russian%20security,arrival%20in%20Kiev.


Gunmen kill more than 60 in concert attack near Moscow, Islamic State claims responsibility

MOSCOW, March 22 (Reuters) - Camouflage-clad gunmen opened fire with automatic weapons at concertgoers near Moscow on Friday, killing at least 60 people and injuring 145 in an attack claimed by Islamic State militants. In the deadliest attack in Russia since the 2004 Beslan school siege, gunmen sprayed civilians with bullets just before Soviet-era rock group "Picnic" was to perform to a full house at the 6,200-seat the Crocus City Hall just west of the capital.
...
Islamic State, the militant group that once sought control over swathes of Iraq and Syria, claimed responsibility for the attack, the group's Amaq agency said on Telegram.
...
The United States has intelligence confirming Islamic State's claim of responsibility for the shooting, a U.S. official said on Friday. The official said Washington had warned Moscow in recent weeks of the possibility of an attack.

"We did warn the Russians appropriately," said the official, speaking on condition of anonymity, without providing any additional details.

"Russia has yet to say who it thinks is responsible."

Selection:. https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/03/media-snippets-related-to-the-crocus-city-hall-attack.html#:~:text=Russia%20has%20yet%20to%20say%20who%20it%20thinks%20is%20responsible.


MoA: The election in Russia saw a record turnout. As expected President Putin did win by a very large margin. His legitimacy is a geopolitical reality:

If Nato expansion is about the perpetuation of US hegemony and de-dollarisation is about the burial of the western financial system that underpins that hegemony, Putin is playing a pivotal role in that historical process. If Putin remains in power till 2030 and fulfils even one half of the ambitious blueprint of social and economic programme for Russia that he outlined in his landmark speech at the Federal Assembly of the parliament, the global strategic balance will have shifted irrevocably and cemented a multipolar world order as the anchor sheet of 21st century politics.

The West knows it, the Russian people know it, the vast majority of nations realise it. That said, it must be understood as well that this is not only Putin’s victory personally but also a consolidation of Russian society around him. And that accounts for the last week’s election turning into such a high-stakes affair

https://www.indianpunchline.com/putins-victory-is-a-geopolitical-reality/ 

Selection:

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/03/russia-is-at-war-.html#more


the Financial Times reported (archived):

The US has urged Ukraine to halt attacks on Russia’s energy infrastructure, warning the drone strikes risk driving up global oil prices and provoking retaliation, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The repeated warnings from Washington were delivered to senior officials at Ukraine’s state security service, the SBU, and its military intelligence directorate, known as the GUR, the people told the Financial Times.

Both intelligence units have steadily expanded their own drone programmes to strike Russian targets on land, sea and in the air since the start of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

https://archive.is/OTRef#selection-2283.0-2291.224 

Selection:

https://www.moonofalabama.org/2024/03/russia-is-at-war-.html#more

RUSSIAN vs Nato

special operation is a voluntarily limited military action whereas a war is only restricted by the international laws governing it

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the Argumenti I Fakty newspaper that “We are at war. Yes, it began as a special military operation, but as soon as this group was formed there, when the collective West became a participant in this on the side of Ukraine, for us it already became a war.” This is unprecedented since national security legislation prohibits the use of the word “war”, which is regarded as a mischaracterization of the way in which Russia is conducting what it refers to as a special operation.

The distinction is important regardless of whatever Western commentators claim since a special operation is a voluntarily limited military action whereas a war is only restricted by the international laws governing it (and only then if they’re abided by or externally enforced). Additionally, fighting what’s legally designated by the state as a war instead of a special operation pressures the authorities to respond accordingly to the West’s participation in this conflict, thus heightening the risk of escalation.

Peskov’s rhetorical shift came as France prepares to conventionally intervene in the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine, which German Chancellor Olaf Scholz inadvertently revealed is already an undeclared but limited hot one that’s thus far remained manageable due to each side abiding by unofficial “rules”. By formalizing and then expanding the presence of French troops in the battlespace, however, President Emmanuel Macron risks exacerbating the NATO-Russian security dilemma to uncontrollable proportions.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/analyzing-the-kremlin-spokesmans



The fact that Friday night’s terrorist attack at the Crocus City Hall venue in Moscow was committed by Tajik migrants has made some wonder whether it’s time for Russia to close its open border policy with Central Asia. Citizens of these countries can enter Russia without a visa for 90 days, where many of them then find employment in manual and/or low-skilled labor to satisfy their host country’s market needs. In return, their remittances keep their struggling countries afloat, thus averting their slide into failed states.

This arrangement is economically beneficial but exposes Russia to security risks. 

.. 

To be absolutely clear, Tajiks are mostly hard-working, peaceful, and secular, but they also have some bad apples within their society too just like all do. That said, three factors set Tajikistan’s riffraff apart from all other countries’ that have visa-free travel to Russia: 

the lingering legacy of the Islamist-inspired civil war from the 1990s;

 geographic proximity to Afghanistan within which ISIS-K operates;

and the presence of more Tajiks in Afghanistan than in Tajikistan itself.

https://korybko.substack.com/p/is-it-time-for-russia-to-close-its

T

090324

Rússia + China

060324 space cooperation, including cooperation on satellite surveillance and space exploration

 060324 "TPI emite contra comandantes do alto escalão da Rússia, [mandados de prisão ]
Tribunal Penal Internacional afirma que militares atacaram infraestruturas civis de forma "claramente excessiva"
Por Da Redação
Atualizado em 5 mar 2024, 13h42 -"
 "Segundo o tribunal, com sede em Haia, “há motivos razoáveis para acreditar que os dois suspeitos são responsáveis pelos ataques com mísseis realizados pelas forças sob o seu comando contra a infraestrutura eléctrica ucraniana desde pelo menos 10 de outubro de 2022 até pelo menos 9 de março de 2023”.
"Segundo o tribunal, com sede em Haia, “há motivos razoáveis para acreditar que os dois suspeitos são responsáveis pelos ataques com mísseis realizados pelas forças sob o seu comando contra a infraestrutura eléctrica ucraniana desde pelo menos 10 de outubro de 2022 até pelo menos 9 de março de 2023”.
Segundo o Comitê de Investigação estatal russo, não há bases para responsabilização criminal de Putin e chefes de Estado usufruem de imunidade sob a Convenção de 1973 das Nações Unidas. De acordo com .."https://veja.abril.com.br/mundo/tpi-emite-mandados-de-prisao-contra-comandantes-do-alto-escalao-da-russia/"
 https://veja.abril.com.br/mundo/tpi-emite-mandados-de-prisao-contra-comandantes-do-alto-escalao-da-russia#:~:text=Segundo%20o%20tribunal%2C%20com%20sede%20em%20%

 
Russian aircraft appear to be continuing to conduct a relatively high volume of glide bomb strikes in Ukraine despite Ukrainian officials’ reports that Ukrainian forces have downed several bomber aircraft in recent weeks. Forbes reported on March 4 that Russian Su-34 aircraft, escorted by Su-35 

vs Moldova : Transnitria e Gagauzia
060324 multi-year hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldova and preventing its accession to the European Union (EU)

"The director of the Moldovan Intelligence and Security Service, Alexandru Musteata, stated on March 5 that the Kremlin has begun to conduct multi-year hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Moldova and preventing its accession to the European Union (EU). Musteata stated that the Kremlin is conducting an “unprecedented level” of hybrid operations aimed at preventing Moldova from joining the EU and keeping Moldova in Russia’s sphere of influence.[25] Musteata stated that the first stage of Russian hybrid operations began with attempts to compromise local elections in 2023 and that Russia intends to also interfere in Moldova’s upcoming presidential election in late 2024 and parliamentary elections in the summer of 2025. Musteata stated that pro-Kremlin Moldovan politicians with ties to the Kremlin, either directly or through Russian and Moldovan organized crime groups, will try to promote pro-Russia policies in the Moldovan Parliament. Musteata warned that Russia plans to provoke protests and incite inter-ethnic conflict and economic and social crises in Moldova, including in the pro-Russian autonomous region of Gagauzia and the pro-Russian breakaway republic of Transnistria. Musteata stated that Moldovan authorities have already observed an increase in the use of social media platforms to spread anti-EU sentiment. ISW previously warned that the Kremlin could intensify hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing and further polarizing Moldova ahead of Moldova-EU accession negotiations and the 2024 presidential election or a suite of other courses of action against Moldova that are not mutually exclusive with hybrid actions.[26]"de 
020324 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the Antalya Diplomatic Forum to promote Kremlin narratives about Moldova, likely to set conditions for potential Kremlin hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).

vs Armênia 
020324 Senior Russian officials acknowledged Armenia’s reduced participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), marking a notable shift in Russian official rhetoric that previously sought to ignore Armenian efforts to distance itself from the CSTO. 
Russia's Navalny's death
020324 displays of anti-war sentiment in Moscow as Russians observed Russian 

Transnitria iSW

Russia internal affairs iSW


Russian geopolitics relations iSW

020324 Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea apparently paused as of mid-February 2024.

vs Ukraine


060324


RUSSIA

Transnitria iSW

Russia internal affairs iSW

The Kremlin appears to have largely permitted displays of anti-war sentiment in Moscow as Russians observed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s funeral on March 1.
Russian Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov inspected a Russian shipbuilding facility and the construction site of a new military hospital in the Republic of Dagestan during a working trip to Russia’s Southern Military District on March 2.

Russian geopolitics relations iSW

Transfers of North Korean weapons to Russia by sea apparently paused as of mid-February 2024.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov publicly rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent offer to host a negotiation platform for Russia and Ukraine.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used the Antalya Diplomatic Forum to promote Kremlin narratives about Moldova, likely to set conditions for potential Kremlin hybrid operations that aim to destabilize Moldova and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).
Senior Russian officials acknowledged Armenia’s reduced participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), marking a notable shift in Russian official rhetoric that previously sought to ignore Armenian efforts to distance itself from the CSTO. 

Navalny's death

hundreds of people bade farewell to Alexey Navalny in Moscow
[Under a heavy police presence, ] after his still unexplained death two weeks ago in an Arctic penal colony.
Mourners chant Alexey Navalny’s name and say they will not forgive Russian authorities for his death.
The funeral on Friday of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fiercest critic followed a battle with authorities over the release of his body.
Navalny’s supporters said several churches in Moscow refused to hold a service for the man who crusaded against official corruption. Many Western leaders blamed his death on the Russian president, an accusation the Kremlin rejects.
https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2024/3/1/photos-thousands-attend-navalny-funeral-as-kremlin-warns-against-protests

Queimando a Terra em direção ao oeste - O que vem a seguir com o colapso do Exército da Ucrânia, 1º de março de 2024 por Yves Smith

 "um dos objectivos da Rússia era uma Ucrânia neutra. A Rússia estava determinada a impedir a OTAN de se situar nas suas fronteiras. Isso tinha sido acordado nos termos do projecto das negociações entre a Ucrânia e a Rússia em Março de 2022.

 Mas agora o que resta da Ucrânia será menor do que a Ucrânia que quase concordou com os termos em 2022. E a Rússia ainda enfrenta a questão de como garantir a neutralidade de uma Ucrânia remanescente, como nas partes da Ucrânia que a Rússia não  ocupa e eventualmente pretende aderir à Federação Russa.  Recorde-se que o processo utilizado com a Crimeia e os quatro "oblasts" adotado recentemente foram referendos.  Tendo seguido esse caminho duas vezes, qualquer outro caminho pareceria ilegítimo.  
Putin também disse logo no início do "SMO" [military special operation] que a Rússia não queria ir para onde não era bem-vinda.  Ele, e provavelmente o resto da liderança russa, não pretende guarnecer território hostil, caro e corrupto.

 Então, como é que a Rússia assegura a neutralidade do que restará da Ucrânia, que está actualmente nas mãos de um governo extremamente hostil e que ainda tem a Europa e os EUA dispostos a apoiá-la de todas as formas que puderem?  
Mesmo que a OTAN seja militarmente impotente em termos de ataque terrestre, ainda poderia instalar lançadores de longo alcance que poderiam possivelmente lançar armas nucleares. E mais perto da fronteira russa neste contexto é claramente menos desejável."
 https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2024/03/scorching-the-earth-westward-what-comes-next-as-the-ukraine-army-collapses.html#:~:text=one%20of%20Russia%E2%80%99s,clearly%20less%20desirable.

Transnitria
Pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway region Transnistria held the Seventh Congress of Transnistrian Deputies on February 28 and adopted a series of decisions that likely aim to provide the Kremlin with justifications for a wide range of possible escalatory actions against Moldova — actions the Kremlin can pursue both immediately and over the long-term. The Kremlin has yet to signal an immediate route for escalation following the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies, although Russian President Vladimir Putin may respond to the Transnistrian requests during his speech to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 29. The Kremlin can use the outcomes of the Congress of Transnistrian Deputies to justify a range of possible COAs that are not mutually exclusive. 

Ukraine

  • Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted another strike on a Russian personnel concentration in occupied Donetsk Oblast, once again sparking ire amongst Russian milbloggers and re-surfacing concerns about Ukraine’s use of HIMARS systems.
  • Russian forces made confirmed advances near Svatove, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.
  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu inspected the Tula State University’s Military Training Center and several defense industrial base (DIB) enterprises in Tula Oblast on February 28.
  • Russian occupation authorities are using early voting for the Russian presidential election to cloak Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine in a veneer of fabricated legitimacy. ISW

Russia internal affairs

  • Russia continues cracking down on actors it deems “foreign agents” to consolidate control over the Russian information space ahead of the March 2024 presidential election.
  • Financial Times (FT) investigation published on February 27, reportedly based on leaked classified Russian military documents from 2008-2014, outlines Russia’s purported criteria for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. ISW

Russian geopolitics relations

  • Turkey and China appear to be pursuing their own negotiation platforms for a settlement in Ukraine, which the Kremlin will likely exploit to further its long-standing narratives regarding negotiations and the war. ISW

270224"Macron yet again has positioned himself and France at the vanguard of a new direction for European foreign and military policy, namely to send ground troops to Ukraine to participate in the war directly and thereby ensure Ukrainian victory and, what is more important, Russian defeat. Following Macron's announcement, his prime minister spoke of the

 need to defeat Russia if Europe is to uphold the principle that democratic countries may not be swallowed up by totalitarian countries.

Macron's proposal was immediately rejected by all major European leaders, including the hitherto most aggressive defenders of Ukraine among them, the United Kingdom, Poland and Germany. High-flying French ideological, geopolitical messaging ran into a brick wall of 

  • down-to-earth and 
  • justified imperatives of self-preservation 
among Macron's peers, all of whom seem finally to take seriously Russian threats of immediate reprisals to those who move outside the fig leaf of proxy war and become de jure co-belligerents."

 https://gilbertdoctorow.com/#:~:text=Macron%20yet%20again,jure%20co%2Dbellig

260224

"Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 25 that Russia is preparing a new offensive that will start in late May or summer 2024, consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have regained the theater-wide initiative and will be able to pursue offensive operations when and where they choose as long as they hold the initiative.

"Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts

Russian Technological Adaptations

Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Significant Activity in Belarus"

 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024#:~:text=Russian%20Main%20Effort%20%E2%80%93%20Eastern%20Ukraine%20(comprised,Significant%20Activity%20in%20Belarus

Sweden will join NATO following Hungary’s formal approval of Sweden’s accession bid on February 26.

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two decrees on February 26 that officially re-establish the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, codifying major Russian military restructuring and reform efforts.

The formal transfer of regions previously under the responsibility of the Northern Fleet is likely part of a wider Russian effort to re-establish military district commands as the primary headquarters for the Russian ground forces while reassigning naval assets to the Russian Navy, as ISW previously reported.

The re-creation of the MMD and LMD supports the parallel objectives of consolidating control over Russian operations in Ukraine in the short-to-medium term and preparing for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO in the long term.

Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov is continuing a recent campaign to engage with Russian military personnel following the Russian capture of Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast and reportedly visited a command post of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) in Ukraine.

Over 20 heads of state, including 15 European Union (EU) leaders met in Paris on February 26 to discuss ramping up ammunition supplies to Ukraine.

Germany announced a new military aid package to Ukraine on February 26.

Transnistrian sources reportedly told Russian independent outlet Verstka that Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova, is not planning to ask to join Russia during the Congress of Deputies in Tiraspol on February 28.

Russian forces recently made confirmed gains near Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.

Russia reportedly imported almost 450 million euros (about $488 million) worth of sanctioned “sensitive” European goods, including weapons technology, between January and "

 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024#:~:text=Key%20Takeaways%3A,between%20January%20and


FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Rússia 

Navalny’s Death 

Russia accountability

", UN bodies such as the human rights committee still have jurisdiction over Russia, and cases already in the European court pipeline will be heard. Just last month, the court decided that the Russian government had a case to answer in a lawsuit brought by myself and others on behalf of Navalny, his Anti-Corruption Foundation and supporters in response to the punitive steps taken against them in 2019, including absurd criminal prosecutions on charges of

 money laundering, their designation as 

“foreign agents”,

raids on their homes and offices, and the

freezing of bank accounts."

 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/19/horror-and-hypocrisy-in-the-wake-of-alexei-navalnys-death#:~:text=%2C%20UN%20bodies%20such,of%20bank%20accounts.


Western Hipocrisy 

190224 "We condemn some dictators for killing their political enemies, but let ourselves be bribed by the blood money of other dictators and agree to overlook their own killings. The condemnation of Vladimir Putin feels like so much cant and hypocrisy.

Robert Frazer

Salford, Lancashire"

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/19/horror-and-hypocrisy-in-the-wake-of-alexei-navalnys-death#:~:text=We%20condemn%20some%20dictators%20for%C2%A0killing%20their%20political%20enemies%2C%20but%20let%20ourselves%20be%20bribed%20by%20the%20blood%20money%20of%20other%20dictators%20and%C2%A0agree%20to%20overlook%20their%20own%20killings.%20The%20condemnation%20of%20Vladimir%20Putin%20feels%20like%20so%20much%C2%A0cant%20and%20hypocrisy.%0ARobert%20Frazer%0ASalford%

2C%20Lancashire


RUSSIA


Putin 

Entrevista Putin and Carlson

https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1755734526678925682?t=rlxpK_sdLgJycK4jLdo8Gw&s=19

120224, às 05:51, 195 Milhões de visualizações; 998k likes; 75.5 k comentário

130224 “Os 15 pontos principais de Putin na entrevista com Tucker Carlson, POR JACK RASMUS, 12/02/ 2024. [TradEdi Vanres]. 

A seguir estão minhas conclusões ao ouvir atentamente a entrevista de Tucker Carlson-Putin da semana passada. Da entrevista resultaram uma série de revelações (por exemplo, 

  • o papel recorrente da França, da Alemanha, do Reino Unido e da CIA na não-resolução do conflito), bem como 
  • o compromisso de Putin em continuar [o que chama de operação militar especial e não de guerra] até que a Ucrânia deixe de ser [considerada, pela entrada na OTan] uma ameaça para a Rússia. Ao ouvir a entrevista, percebe-se que
  •  Putin sente que foi “enganado” pelos EUA/UE com tanta frequência que já não confia nos seus políticos e não acredita que os presidentes dos EUA tenham o poder de decidir; Ele, e os russos em geral, têm uma 
  • profunda convicção de que a Rússia e a Ucrânia (e a Bielorrússia) são “um só povo” que foi dividido por invasores no passado, mas sempre reunido novamente; e que 
  • ele está pronto para negociar, mas Zelensky e os EUA/OTAN descartaram a possibilidade e teriam [agora de dar os passos necessários para negociações]. Em fim,
  • as sanções dos EUA falharam, 
  • o mundo está a mudar rapidamente e 
  • muitos países desenvolveram-se ao ponto de já não fazerem tudo o que os EUA querem, além de exigirem mais independência."

 15 conclusões…

https://www.counterpunch.org/2024/02/12/putins-15-major-points-in-tucker-carlson-interview/#:~:text=FEBRUARY%2012%2C%202024,demanding%20more%20independence

120224" interessante só depois dos 50 minutos de entrevista [, disse Gilbert Doctorow, analista belga da mídia Rússia]. [TradEdi Vanres].

110224 "O que Vladimir Putin disse a Tucker Carlson?, by Al Jazeera [TradE

di Vanres]

Russia.

"The Kremlin continues to promote Russia’s efforts to expand its defense industrial base (DIB)."

 https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024#:~:text=the%20entire%20frontline.-,The%20Kremlin%20continues%20to%20promote%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20efforts%20to%20expand%20its%20defense%20industrial%20base%20(DIB).,-Zaporizhia%20Oblast%20occupation

avdiivka

210224 "The Russian capture of Avdiivka after four months of intensified offensive operations exemplifies the way that Russian forces pursue offensive operations that do not necessarily set conditions for wider operational gains but still force Ukraine to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations.. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024#:~:text=Key%20Takeaways%3A-,Ukrainian%20forces%20will%20


Navalny's Death

Russia’s imperial indocrination

Education of Ukrainian 

200224 Russian occupation officials continue to use educational programs as means of Russifying occupied Ukraine."

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024#:~:text=Key%20Takeaways%3A-,Ukrainian%20forces%

20will% de

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